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THE MEANING OF PRESENT VALUE AS PUBLIC
UTILITY RATE BASE
LAWRENCE P. SIMPSON*
When the United States Supreme Court, in Munn. v.
Illinois,' decided that property devoted to a use in which the
public had an interest was subject to regulation for the
common good, it opened up a field of inquiry whose exact
boundaries, even after more than fifty years of judicial
utterance upon the subject, have not yet been defined. That
this power of public control is somewhere limited by the
constitutional guaranty of immunity from confiscation of
property without due process of law, was settled in Chicago,
Milwaukee & St. Paul Railwayz Con pany v. Minnesota.2
The privilege of a public utility to earn a fair return on the
value of its property used and useful in furnishing the ser-
vice is protected by the courts, in that wherever, by the
exercise of regulation, a state so reduces the rate of return
that it is no longer 'fair' in relation to the value of the prop-
erty, such act is confiscatory and void.
The history of public utility valuation for rate making
purposes dates from the case of Smyth v. Ames.. decided in
1898. In that case Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for an un-
divided court, stated the 'rule' by which the constitutional
limitations upon the -rate making power might be judged.
"We hold, however, that the basis of all calculations
as to the reasonableness of rates to be charged must be
the fair value of the property being used for the con-
venience of the public. And in order to ascertain that
value the original cost of construction, the amount ex-
pended in permanent improvements, the amount and
market value of its bonds and stock, the present as com-
pared with the original cost of construction, the probable
earning capacity of the property under particular rates
* Associate in Business Law, University of Illinois.
94 U. S. 113 (1876).
2 134 U. S. 418 (1890).
8 169 U. S. 466 (1898).
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prescribed by statute, and the sum required to meet
operating expenses, are all matters for consideration,
and are to be given such weight as may be just and
,right in each case."
Inasmuch as every rate case since 1898 has quoted and
purported to apply the rule in Smyth v. Ames, it is a matter
of first importance to attempt to get some idea of what the
rule means and how it is supposed to work. Seven elements
in valuation are stated, with the direction that each is to be
'taken into consideration' and 'given such weight as may
be just and right in each case.' Does this mean that, so long
as the tribunal has permitted the introduction of evidence
on each element and avowedly has 'considered' them all, there
has been due process, even though it is obvious that the valua-
tion fixed must have been arrived at through the application
of one alone? In other words, is the judgment of the rate
making body final, under the rule of Smyth v. Ames, as to
the amount of weight to be given a particular element? In
the Minnesota. Rate Cases' it was stated by Mr. Justice
Hughes, that "the ascertainment of that value is not con-
trolled by artificial rules. It is not a matter of formula, but
there must be a reasonable judgment having its basis in a
proper consideration of all relevant facts." But whose judg-
ment is to be taken? The supreme court of Wisconsin, in
Wailkesha Gas Company v. Railroad Commission,' was
much puzzled by the interpretations given the rule of Smyth
v. Ames by the United States Supreme Court. The Wis-
consin court expressed its wonder whether "the mere asser-
tion by commissions and courts that they have considered
the cost of reproduction new is sufficient to conclude the
appellate court," and states its belief to the effect: "It can-
not be that mere repetition of a legalistic formula before the
declaration of the trial court's final determination is suf-
ficient to bless and sanctify the result, no matter what it
might be." It does not seem, from the opinions in the
Southwestern Bell Telephone Case and the Georgia Railway
Case, that the judgment of the rate commissions can be
taken to be final; but the one proposition at least is clear
4 230 U. S. 353 at 434 (1913).
5 181 Wis. 281, 194 N. W. 846 (1923).
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that refusal to hear testimony as to the various elements of
value is of itself reversible error. We shall later consider
these cases in detail on the requirements of the rule in
Srmyth v. Ames. It will be sufficient at this point to outline
the possible ways in which the rule might be interpreted.
These are:
1. That the rule of Smyt& v. Ames is only evidentiary,
declaring the elements of value which are to be con-
sidered, and that -refusal to hear testimony bearing
thereon is error.
2. That the elements of value named are to be given equal
weight, and the ultimate valuation to be a composite or
average of all.
3. That a single element of value may be made the con-
trolling and sole basis of valuation, to the exclusion of
all others, so long as all were 'considered,' and a de-
liberate judgment exercised.
4. That certain elements of value are to be given more
weight than others, according to what is 'just and right
in the particular case.'
(1) That in fixing the proportion between the weight
accorded the several elements, the judgment of the
rate making body is to be conclusive.
(2) That the judgment of the rate making body is
subject to review by the courts on the question
whether the degree of weight accorded a particular
element is proper.
In addition to these there is the further possibility that
Smyth v. Ames has been overruled, and that some one
definite valuation base is now controlling.
Of the several elements suggested in the Smyth Case, only
two have emerged as seriously contested bases of valuation.
These are: (1) reproduction cost of the properties, and (2)
actual or original cost. Under the Smyth rule, a rate mak-
ing body is free to adopt both, if that is possible. Whether
it may, or must, choose one to the exclusion of the other, is
3
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our present problem. Also it is to be noted that whenever
there is a large dilfTerential between present and past general
price level, the use of reproduction cost as a valuation base
will produce a resultant 'present value' radically different
from that reached by the use of original cost method. There-
fore, in considering the cases two questions are to be kept in
mind:
1. Is there one, definite, standard of rate base? In other
words, of the several possible methods of determining
present value, has any one become controlling?
2. Is there a relation between change in price level and
the method of rate base determination favored at the
particular time by the court?
In the Smyth v. Ames Case, the Supreme Court held that
fair present value was the correct rate base, but the meaning
of "fair present value" and the means by which it might
with some degree of certainty be ascertained, were not
pointed out. The concept was as undefined as the test of a
business "affected with a public interest." Present value
means nothing inv acto. It is not synonymous with present
cost, nor with original cost, although it might become so for
either were the Supreme Court to adopt one or the other as
its sole means of ascertainment. Present value is only an-
other word for rate base, and its method of determination is
yet in doubt. Were the court to establish the proposition
that present reproduction cost is the proper, and only,
method by which present value in the rate making sense is
to be fixed, then the meaning of present value and reproduc-
tion cost would be identical. And similarly as to original
cost. But until something like this has happened, it is
difficult to see how the statement that "present value is the
proper rate base" can mean more than empty repetition.
During the final ten years of the nineteenth century, price
level had reached low ebb. Following the panic of 1893,
price depression came to a maximum about the date of the de-
cision in Smyth v. Ames. It therefore was not surprising to
find the railroad and utility interests arguing for original
cost as represented by capitalization as the proper base to
4
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fix rates. Similarly, on behalf of the public, the adoption of
present replacement cost as to measure or evidence of pres-
ent value was urged. From the beginning the tendency was
undoubtedly away from investment as the measure. The
case of Steenerson, v. Great Northern Railway' decided dur-
ing this period of price depression, expresses the trend at
the time. In this case, the investment theory, and capitaliza-
tion upon earnings as well, were urged upon the court. It
emphatically rejected both, and also the amount of stocks
and bQnds.
"The material question is not what the railroad cost
originally, but what it would cost to reproduce it. The
rights of the bondholders are no more and no less sacred
than the rights of other property holders. If the road
was built when iron rails cost $85 per ton and every-
thing else in proportion, and now steel rails cost only
.16 per ton, if it cost 40,000 a mile to build the older
portions of the road when last year as good a road was
built for 12,000, that is the misfortune of the owners
who paid the higher prices. The state does not guaran-
tee the investor in a railway more than in other prop-
erty. The cost of reproduction must be estimated on a
present cash basis."
In San Diego Land Compamnj v. National City 7 and Sa
Diego Land Company v. Jasper,'8 both cases decided during
the low price level, the utility contended for original cost as
the rate base. In the former case, Mr. Justice Harlan up-
held the opinion of the lower court that it is the actual value
of the property at the time the rates are to be fixed, and not
its cost, that should form the basis on which to compute
rates. In the Jasper Case, Justice Holmes said:
"It is no longer open to dispute that under the Con-
stitution what the Company is entitled to demand, in
order that it might have just compensation, is a fair re-
turn upon the reasonable value of the property at the
time it is being used for the public. San Diego Land
Co. v. National City. That is decided, and is decided
against the contention that you are to take the actual
6 69 Minn. 353 (1897).
7 174 U. S. 757 (1898).
8 189 U. S. 439 (1902).
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cost of the plant, cost of operation, annual depreciation,
and a fair profit to the company over and above such
charges by way of interest on the money expended. Yet
the only evidence of a higher value in this case, is the
original cost of the work. ..
The Commission fixed the valuation at 350,000, on the
basis of replacement cost. The company was permitted to
introduce evidence of original cost by which it claimed a
valuation of $1,000,000, but the Commission exercised its
judgment to give controlling weight to the lower reproduc-
tion cost factor, and the Supreme Court held the rate fixed
not confiscatory, saying: "No doubt original cost may be
considered, but in the present case it has no importance."
The period from 1900 to 1910 marked a gradual but
steady increase in general price level, and toward the end
of the decade the effect of the increase began to be noted in
rate valuations. The case of Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas
Company,' decided in 1909, involved the 80 cent gas rate
fixed by the New York legislature. Although the issue of
original versus replacement cost was not directly discussed
in the opinion, yet the language used by Mr. Justice Peck-
ham to the effect that "the value of the property is to be
determined as of the time when the inquiry is made concern-
ing rates," shows the insistence upon giving weight in the
valuation to present costs. The court seems already to fore-
see the situation not far ahead in which the enormous in-
crease in property valuation might make the present cost
element impossible as the controlling element in fixing a rate
base, and paves the way for an exception "where the prop-
erty may have increased so enormously in value as to render
a rate permitting a reasonable return upon such increased
value unjust to the public."
Such impossible situations soon arose as prices ap-
preciated, a good illustration being in re Advances in Rates
-The Burlington Claim of Legal Right, 1911.11 The con-
tention was that the road was entitled "as a matter of legal
right to a fair return upon the actual value of its property
0 212 U. S. 153 (1909).
10 20 I. C. C. Rep. 307 (1911).
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used for transportation, which value ... is measured by the
cost of presently reproducing its physical plant." It repre-
sented that the Burlington road cost those who built it
$258,000,000, that it would cost to reproduce it $530,000,000,
to which should be added some amount for going-concern-
value, and a further amount for franchise rights; that this
belongs to the owners and they are entitled to a fair return
upon it. Although more than $270,000,000 of this sum did
not represent the investment of a dollar by the owners, and
the road was earning 18 per cent dividends on the stock be-
sides paying all interest on the bonds, yet it sought permis-
sion to raise its rates on the ground that they provided an
insufficient return on the actual fair value of the road. These
contentions the Interstate Commerce Commission refused to
approve. In the Minnesota Rate Cases," the Supreme Court
approved the Smyth rule as to the consideration of all ele-
ments, and definitely refused to make reproduction cost the
sole test of value nor even to consider it at whatever point
its results would lead to values the court considers not fair.
And as far as the present prospect goes, so it will be in most
railroad rate cases.
The Des Moines Gas Company Case," decided in 1914, did
not involve the question of an alternative between reproduc-
tion cost and actual cost, for the master found the rate fixed
not confiscatory on the basis most favorable to the Company,
namely, reproduction cost. He arrived at the valuation by
finding what it would cost to produce a similar plant new at
the time of the rate hearing; to this he added overhead
charges, 15 per cent, $300,000, and from the total deducted
$330,000 depreciation, leaving the value as rate base of
.$1,937,000. In this as in all preceding cases, the judgment
of the commission as to valuation was upheld.
No very definite conclusions on valuation and a definite
meaning for the rule in Smyth v. Ames can be drawn from
any one, or all, of the rate cases decided by the Supreme
Court during the twenty years after 1900. Present value is
to be taken as the rate base, but its method of ascertainment
yet remains judgment and not rule. Conceivably present
1- 230 U. S. 353 (1913).
12 238 U. S. 153 (1915).
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value may be determined (1) by taking the historical cost
and adding thereto cost of subsequent improvements, in-
crease in property values, overhead, and going value; or (2)
by estimating what it would cost to reproduce a similar
plant and organization at present prices. The debate be-
tween reproduction cost and actual cost methods of ascer-
taining present value was now on in good earnest, the tre-
mendous increase in prices due to the war making it a really
vital matter.
In 1921 the case of Galveston Electric Railway v. City of
Galveston" came before the Supreme Court. The city com-
mission had fixed fares at five cents in 1919, and after
operating under the rate for eleven months the company
brought a bill for injunction in the federal court. The
matter was referred to a master, who found the rate con-
fiscatory; but he was overruled by the lower court, which
upheld the rate. On appeal, the United States Supreme
Court affirmed the decree declaring the rate not confiscatory.
In this case the method of ascertainment of present
value was not reproduction cost at present prices, but
estimated original cost plus thirty-three and one-third
per cent in recognition of the higher price level. Specifically,
the method used was to take the estimated historical
cost of reproduction as of 1913 when the plant was built
(prudent investment method), and add thereto the dif-
ference between that price level and a prophesied future
price level which was called the "future plateau of prices."
The price level at the time of the hearing (1921) was
100 per cent above what it had been in 1913; the com-
pany's expert testified the future price level when stabilized
would be 70 per cent above 1913; the master, that an increase
of one-third would be fair, and the court adopted the latter
estimate. Therefore the rate base was made by taking the
amount of money which would have been necessary to build
the plant in 1913, adding one-third to that sum, and then
deducting depreciation. Mr. Justice Brandeis delivered the
opinion for an undivided court. Since the increase in price
level was recognized and some weight given to replacement
cost, all members of the court were in accord on the decision
Is 258 U. S. 388 (1922).
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that the valuation was proper, the matter of proportion
seeming to lie within the judgment of the rate making body.
Of all rate cases, one of the most interesting is South-
western, Bell Telephone Company v. Missozr'i Commission,"'
decided May 21, 1923. In this case the Commission had
found present value by a partial estimate of the original
cost of the properties less depreciation. Here for the first
time in rate valuation, the Supreme Court divided on the
issue of reproduction cost against original cost, a minority
opinion being filed by Mr. Justice Brandeis in which Mr.
Justice Holmes concurred. Also, in this case for the first
time since Smyth v. Ames, the Supreme Court declared void
a rate order of a state commission on the ground that the
finding of the rate base, or value, was too low. Mr. Justice
McReynolds, who wrote the opinion for the majority, said:
"Obviously the Commission undertook to value the
property without according any weight to the greatly
enhanced cost of material, labor, supplies, etc., over
those prevailing in 1913, 1914 and 1916. As matter of
common knowledge, these increases were large. Com-
petent witnesses estimated them at 45 to 50 per cent."
The error of the Commission clearly was that it failed to
give any weight to present reproduction cost, or to recognize
the higher price level, as was done in the Galveston Case.
It seems fairly well settled that had they done so, even
though a lesser percentage was by their judgment allowed,
the court would have upheld the rate. Some weight must
be given present replacement cost; although at that time the
determination of how much seemed to lie within the discre-
tion and judgment of the rate making body.
The minority opinion points out all of the difficulties,
weaknesses, and defects of the reproduction cost method of
valuation, and presents the strongest of cases for the original
cost method, or rather, the prudent investment method.
From the standpoint of content, compactness, and terse
statement of all the voluminous arguments elsewhere written
on the subject, the opinion is memorable. Justice Brandeis
14 262 U. S. 276 (1923).
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and Holmes dissented from the opinion of the majority,
disagreeing that reproduction cost should be permitted
longer to be even an element in valuation, and urged pru-
dent investment as the sole element; but they concurred in
the judgment that the rates were confiscatory, even on origi-
nal cost. It is to be particularly noted that in this case
although the higher price level was at least 50 per cent In
advance of that at the time the plant was built, yet the ma-
jority opinion only added about 25 per cent to the invest-
ment in setting up a valuation on which to judge the ade-
quacy of the rates. At most, therefore, only equal weight
was given to reproduction cost as to the actual cost of the
properties. It would seem that reproduction cost had not
yet become the only factor in valuation, that the insistence
was upon some weight and recognition being given to it, and
that the matter of proportion still lay within the judgment
of the rate making body. On the point that in this case for
the first time the judgment of the rate tribunal was set aside
by the court and the rates declared confiscatory, note that
apparently the rates fixed by the commission were in-
adequate on any basis of valuation, even original cost, since
the minority contending for that method agreed with the
decision that the rates were confiscatory.
The case of Bluefield Water Company v. West Virginia
Commissio 1" closely parallels the Southwestern Bell de-
cision. Here also the commission's valuation was held con-
fiscatory for the reason that no weight was given to the
present replacement cost factor, and that even on original
cost basis the rates fixed were too low to secure a fair re-
turn.
The case of Georgia Railway v. Railroad Commission,'
decided June 11, 1923, the same day of the decision In the
Bluefield Case and within a month after the Southwestern
Bell decision, presents some difficulties. Here the gas rate
for the city of Atlanta had been reduced from $1.65 to gl.55
per M by the Commission, and the rate was attacked by the
'r 262 U. S. 679 (1923).
10 262 U. S. 625 (1923).
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company as confiscatory.. The federal district court sus-
tained the rate, and the Supreme Court, contrary to its ac-
tion in the Southwestern Bell and Bluefield Cases, upheld
that decision. The commission took, as its measure of ascer-
taining present value, reproduction cost as of 1914, instead
of present reproduction cost (as of 1921) when the price
level was about 70 per cent higher. It found a valuation of
51/4 millions as compared with the company's present repro-
duction cost claim of 9 millions. It did, however, allow
for increased values to the extent of adding *125,000 to rep-
resent the appreciation in land values. Mr. Justice Brandeis,
who it will be remembered wrote the minority opinion in
the Southwestern Bell Case condemning reproduction cost
method, delivered the opinion of the court upholding the
rate. He distinguished the case from Southwestern Bell no
further than by saying:
" Here the commission gave careful consideration to
the cost of reproduction; but it refused to adopt repro-
duction cost as the measure of value. It declared that
the exercise of a reasonable judgment as to the present
fair value required some consideration of reproduction
costs as well as original costs, but that 'present fair
value' is not synonymous with 'present replacement
cost,' particularly under abnormal conditions. .-. The
refitsal of the commission and of the lower court to hold
that, for rate making purposes, the physical properties
of a utility must be valued at the replacement cost less
depreciation was clearly correct."
The opinion in this case makes it clear that there is still
no one method by which present value must be ascertained;
that all elements and methods of valuation must receive
consideration by the rate making body, but that if, upon
due consideration, that tribunal exercises its judgment to
give greater weight to one than to another, then, at least so
long as it gives some weight to each, its judgment as to
valuation will not be disturbed. It will be remembered that
this case was decided during a shifting price level period.
Here the commission gave effect to increased values only to
the extent of the appreciated value of the lands, 125,000.
11
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Assuming the 92 millions to be the "correct reproduction
cost figure, and 51/ millions the original cost, the addition
of the $125,000 to the latter would amount according weight
of only 1/33 to reproduction cost, whereas 32/33 weight
was accorded original cost. Yet the Supreme Court upheld
the valuation.1 What is the explanation of the different
result reached in the Bluefield Case? The method of valua-
tion was identical, both cases were decided on the same day;
the only difference is that in the latter case no weight was
given present or reproduction cost, whereas in the Georgia
Case 1/33 of the total weight was given to higher present
cost as represented by the $125,000 added for appreciated
land values. Evidently it is enough that some weight be
given; the matter of proportion seems to lie within the judg-
ment of the rate commission.
We now come to the last of the extraordinary series of
cases decided since 1920, the case of Mcardle v. Indianapo-
lis Water Company,"5 decided November 22, 1926. This case
is heralded with complete confidence by certain commenta-
tors"0 as "sounding a declaration of the amount of considera-
tion to be given the reproduction cost element." It "appears
to be a whole-hearted adoption of the cost of reproduction
theory, eliminating entirely the other elements specified for
consideration in Smyth v. Ames. Now the cost of reproduc-
tion is to be dominant, we are brought safely from the sea
of uncertainties, closer to rules and regulations, and farther
away from 'judgment and discretion.'"
The valuation found by the Commission of the water com-
pany's properties upon which it fixed the rate complained of,
was in round numbers $15,000,000. The federal district court
enjoined enforcement of the rate on the ground that it was
confiscatory, and found a valuation of $19,000,000. On ap-
peal to the United States Supreme Court, that body, in an
opinion written by Mr. Justice Butler, affirmed the decree,
17 Note: In the Georgia Case, Mr. Justice McKenna filed a dissent ex-
tremely ironical in character, on The basis of the Bell and Bluefield Cases;
between which and the present case he is unable to distinguish. He finds
special grievance in the fact that "no attempt was made to distinguish this
case and the Bluefield Case."
is 272 U. S. 400 (1926).
19 "Pub. Utility Valuation for Rate Making Purposes," 26 M ir. L. Ilv.
89.
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and declared that upon the evidence the present value of the
property was not less than $19,000,000, and that upon that
valuation the rate was confiscatory and void.
Of this case, of which so little may be said with comfort-
able assurance, we may make the following statements:
1. Neither original cost, nor reproduction cost, alone,
was either "dominant" or "controlling." Neither was
made the sole measure of valuation; both were given
some weight. Present reproduction cost of the bare
physical properties was by the Commission's (p. 418)
$19,500,000, exclusive of going value and water rights
valued at 2,000,000, which totals at lowest $21,500,000.
Original cost was stated by the Commission (p. 419) to
be "12 to 20 per cent less than the 15,000,000 valuation
taken by that body as the rate base and disapproved in
the decree. The situation is:
Present reproduction cost ------------ 21,500,000
Original cost --------------------- 13,000,000
Valuation by Commission ------------ 15,000,000
Valuation by Court ---------------- 19,000,000
2. More "weight" was in this case given to reproduction
cost than to original cost, in that the valuation figure
lies nearer the amount of the former than it does to the
latter; but neither was identified with value. Indeed,
Mr. Justice Butler denies that reproduction cost is to
be considered dominant or controlling method of valua-
tion, citing Smykh v. Ames and saying: "-While some
expressions of the district judge indicate that he was
of the opinion that dominant or controlling weight
should be given to cost of reproduction based on spot
prices, it is clear that the $19,000,000 fixed by him as
the minimum valuation could not have been arrived at
on that basis."
3. The reason for the emphasis here upon the reproduc-
tion cost element is that in the opinion of the court the
differential between present settled price level and
historical cost at time of construction had in this case
13
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become so great that the worth of the latter as evidence
of present value is relatively less.
4. The Commission's valuation was declared bad, not
because it failed to use present reproduction cost as its
sole measure of value, but for reasons as follows:
(a) "The price level adopted by the Commission-the
average for ten years ending with 1921-was too low.
It should have taken into account the high level of
prices prevailing in 1922 and 1923 in finding value as
of January 1, 1924." (p. 412)
(b) "The average of prices (for the ten year period
ending 1923 which the Commission should have
taken) was shown by the Commission's engineer to
produce a result 14 per cent higher than the figure
adopted." (p. 411).
(c) "Commission's reduction from $1,416,000 to
$980,000 for water rights and going value was not
justified and is error." (p. 415).
(d) "The deduction made for depreciation is not
proper in kind, and cannot be approved, since it was
not based on an inspection of the properties, but was
the result of a straight line calculation based on age
and the estimated or assumed useful life of perishable
elements." (p. 416).
On a fair analysis of the 1fcCardle Case it does not seem
that the rule of ,Smyth v. Ames has been departed from. Re-
production cost has not been made synonymous with present
value, but, like original cost, it yet remains no more than one
of the factors to be considered in determination of the rate
base. A relatively permanent and stabilized higher price
level will operate to influence the relative weight given the
several factors, but that is a far different thing than that
reproduction cost has become identified with present value.
The cases from 1920 to 1927 present an interesting study
in the conflicting points of view of the several justices of the
Supreme Court on the matter of rate base. McReynolds,
Butler, and McKenna on the one hand emphasize the re-
placement cost factor, while Brandeis, Holmes, and Stone,
on the other, hold original cost as of first importance. In
14
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the Southwestern Bell Case, the majority opinion is written
by McReynolds, the court continuing its policy of fixing
present value after consideration of all of the factors. The
minority opinion is written by Brandeis, with whom Holmes
concurs, and therein prudent investment as the only proper
measure of present value is strongly urged. In the Bluefield
Case, Mr. Justice Butler delivered the opinion of the court,
and the rate base here, as in the Bell Case, was declared con-
fiscatory, quite evidently because no weight had been given
the reproduction cost factor. Here again Mr. Justice Bran-
deis dissents from the reasoning of the majority, and on the
same grounds, although he is again concurring with the
judgment. In the Georgia Railway Case, decided the same
day as the Bluefield Case, it is Mr. Justice Brandeis who
writes the opinion for the majority, upholding the rate.
Quite unexpectedly, Justices McReynolds and Butler are
with the majority, they evidently endorsing Brandeis' state-
ment that: "The refusal of the commission and of the lower
court to hold that, for rate making purposes, the physical
properties of a utility must be valued at the replacement
cost less depreciation was clearly correct." Mr. Justice Mc-
Kenna here files a dissent in the interest of consistency, he
being unable to distinguish this case from the Bluefield
Case. Then when we come to the McCardle Case, the pen-
dulum has swung back, the rate is declared confiscatory, and
it is Mr. Justice Butler who delivers the majority opinion,
emphasizing reproduction cost in terms stronger than can
be found in any previous case. Mr. Justice Brandeis writes
a vigorous dissent in which he is joined by Mr. Justice
Stone. Holmes concurs in the result, but not in the reason-
ing by which it is reached.
Two statements of the Supreme Court, one in the Georgia
Case, and the other in the McCardle Case, are very frequent-
ly cited as standing for two different propositions. Pro-
ponents of the original cost theory, in support of their
position, quote the following expression from Mr. Justice
Brandeis' opinion in the Georgia Case:
"The refusal of the Commission and of the lower
court to hold that, for rate making purposes, the
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physical properties of a utility must be valued at the re-
placement cost less depreciation was clearly correct."
Reproduction cost adherents, on the other hand, and also
those who are urgent for a "definite" rule on valuation, quote
the following phrase from Mr. Justice Butler's opinion in
the McCardle Case to show that the Supreme Court in this
latest decision has identified reproduction cost with present
value:
"And, as indicated by the report of the Commission,
it is true that, if the tendency or trend of prices is not
definitely upward or downward and it does not appear
probable that there will be a substantial change of
prices, then the present value of lands, plus the present
cost of reconstructing the plant, less depreciation, if
any, is a fair measure of the value of the physical ele-
ments of the property."
We have already considered the actual results reached in
the two cases; it remains to analyze these expressions with a
view to discovering whether they actually are commitments
on either method of valuation. Paraphrased, Mr. Justice
Brandeis' statement amounts to this:
The Commission may, properly, refuse to hold that
reproduction cost is the equivalent of present value for
rate making purposes.
Similarly, Mr. Justice Butler's statement in the McCardle
case,
The Commission may, where price level is stabilized,
hold that reproduction cost is a fair measure of present
value for rate making purposes.
If these are fair interpretations of the two statements, then
all inconsistency in the Court's attitude disappears, for it is
saying the same thing in both cases, and the same thing it
has always said since Smyth v. Ames, namely, that it is
within the judgment and sound discretion of the rate mak-
ing body to give "such weight to the several elements of
value as may be just and right in each case." The tribunal
may refuse to find the rate base by reproduction cost,
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(Georgia Case), or, where price level is stabilized, it may
(if in its judgment it deems that method just and right in
the case under consideration) adopt the reproduction cost
figure as the rate value (Mc~ardle Case). It is submitted
that neither expression of the Supreme Court states what
the rate body must do.
It is not within the scope of the subject of this paper to go
into the relative merits or defects of the debated methods of
rate valuation. Our problem is whether or not there has
developed within the thirty years of judicial interpretation
of the rule in Smyth v. Ames any one, definite, standard of
rate base. We conclude there has not. The matter of de-
termination of present value for rate making purposes still
remains a matter of judgment and not of formula; the seve-
ral elements must receive due consideration and be given
"such weight as may be just and right in each case."
The consistent refusal of the Supreme Court to adopt any
one method of valuation, its insistence that all be considered,
-seems, in view of recent developments in the railroad rate
problem, the most fortunate thing that could have happened.
Had the Court departed from the principle of Smyth v.
A~mes, and identified reproduction cost with rate base, it
would be already committed to a decision in the case of
Excess Income of St. Louis . O'F7allon Railway Coampany,
now pending, the result of which decision the Interstate
Commerce Commission has declared would be "nothing short
of a public calamity."2 In 1920, the time of the general
railway rate increase, the aggregate value of property used
for transportation purposes was taken by the Commission
to be eighteen billions of dollars based on 1914 price level.
As pointed out by the Commission in its report on the
O'Fallon Case,' had the cost of reproduction theory been
used, the value of the same property would have been over
forty-one billions-an increase of twenty-three billions of
dollars on which the public would have been required to pay
a fair return. An impossible valuation-impossible because
rates based thereon would be more than the traffic would
bear. Increasing rates beyond a certain point inevitably
20 124 L C. 0. Rep. 3, at p. 53 (1927).
21 Ibid., at p. 53.
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means diminishing, rather than increasing, returns. As to
many commodities, transportation rates already have
reached what might be called the efficient maximum.
If in its decision of the O'Fallon Case the Supreme Court
should declare that the fair value of the railroads for pur-
poses of recapture and of rate maling must be determined
by reproduction cost, the result would be tantamount to an
abolition of rate regulation. Although accurate figures for
total valuation of all railroads and utilities by reproduction
cost are unknown, still the approximation reached by the
Commerce Commission is that, "In the case of railroads and
public utilities the current cost of reproduction doctrine
would probably increase the public burden by upwards of
$30,000,000,000.1122 With the rates at present in force already
approaching efficient maximum, based for the most part, at
least as to railroad property, on original cost, it is not
difficult to predict that a thirty billion dollar increase in
rate base would be to raise the maximum beyond what the
traffic will bear. Such rate regulation as would exist there-
after must inevitably lie in the realms of pure theory.
It is extremely doubtful that the Supreme Court in the
O'Fallon Case will insist that controlling weight be given
reproduction cost. It may be that, like the district court,21
it will ignore the whole question of valuation and decide
simply that there is no confiscation, even on the reproduction
cost value contended for by the railroad. But even if the
method of valuation employed by the Commission is re-
viewed, it is difficult to see where in any of the past cases
the Supreme Court has precluded itself from indorsing the
original cost valuation employed by the Commerce Commis-
sion, if in this particular case it deems that method "just
and right."
CONCLUSION.
Considering all of the rate cases in perspective, the fol-
lowing broad propositions may be suggested by way of con-
clusion:
22 Ibid., at p. 54.
22 St. Louis & 'Falon Ry. Co. v. U. S., 22 Fed. (2d) 980 (1927).
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1. It cannot be said that the Supreme Court has ever
committed itself to any one method of ascertaining pres-
ent value for rate making purposes. No single element
of value has been made the controlling and sole basis
of rates. Determination of present value remains a
matter of judgment and not of formula, and the judg-
ment of the rate making body thereon will not be dis-
turbed by the courts so long as the several elements
were given proper weight in forming the judgment.
As a corrollary to this, we may say that the rule
of Smyth v. Ames is not dead; that it remains the guid-
ing principle in valuation, in that no one method has
been adopted to the exclusion of the others; but the
deliberate intention of avoidance of such action is yet
maintained in order that future cases arising under
changed conditions may receive a proper consideration.
2. Where the differential between the general price levels
of the time of original construction and of the time of
the rate inquiry is great, and where it appears that pres-
ent price level is relatively permanent and stabilized,
substantial weight should be given the reproduction
cost factor wherever it is practicable to do so.
3. The judgment of the rate making body cannot, since
the McCardle Case, be said to be conclusive in fixing
the proportionate weight to be accorded the several
factors of valuation; its judgment is subject to review
by the courts on the question whether the degree of
weight accorded a particular element was proper.
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